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Abstract
The need for integration of ontologies with nonmonotonic rules has been gaining impor-
tance in a number of areas, such as the Semantic Web. A number of researchers addressed
this problem by proposing a unified semantics for hybrid knowledge bases composed of
both an ontology (expressed in a fragment of first-order logic) and nonmonotonic rules.
These semantics have matured over the years, but only provide solutions for the static
case when knowledge does not need to evolve.
In this paper we take a first step towards addressing the dynamics of hybrid knowledge
bases. We focus on knowledge updates and, considering the state of the art of belief update,
ontology update and rule update, we show that current solutions are only partial and
difficult to combine. Then we extend the existing work on ABox updates with rules, provide
a semantics for such evolving hybrid knowledge bases and study its basic properties.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that an update operator is proposed
for hybrid knowledge bases.
KEYWORDS: belief change, belief update, hybrid knowledge bases, ontologies, rules, de-
scription logics, answer set programming, semantic web
1 Introduction
In this paper we address updates of hybrid knowledge bases composed of a Descrip-
tion Logic ontology and Logic Programming rules. We propose an operator to be
used when a hybrid theory is updated by new observations of a changing world,
examine its properties, and discuss open problems pointing to future research.
∗ Supported by FCT Scholarship SFRH/BD/38214/2007. Participation on conference supported
by FLoC 2010 Student Travel Support and by APPIA Study Scholarship.
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The Semantic Web was initiated almost a decade ago with an ambitious plan
regarding the sharing of metadata and knowledge in the Web, enhanced with rea-
soning services for advanced new applications (Berners-Lee et al. 2001). Since then,
the considerable amount of research devoted to this endeavour originated impor-
tant foundational results and a deeper understanding of the issues involved, while
identifying important conclusions regarding future developments, namely that:
1. Ontologies are necessary and useful for knowledge representation in the Se-
mantic Web. The formalisms developed, e.g. OWL, are powerful enough to
capture existing modelling languages used in software engineering, and ex-
tend their capabilities. Ontologies are usually based on decidable, as well as
tractable, fragments of Classical Logic, such as the Description Logics (DL)
(Baader et al. 2003). They adopt the open world assumption (OWA) i.e. they
view a knowledge base, by assumption, to be potentially incomplete, hence a
proposition p is false only if the knowledge base is inconsistent with p. This
suits well the open nature of such systems where complete knowledge about
the environment cannot be assumed.
2. Rules are fundamental to overcome the limitations found in OWL. They enjoy
formal, declarative and well-understood semantics, the stable model seman-
tics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) and its tractable approximation, the three-
valued well-founded semantics (Gelder et al. 1991) being the most prominent
and widely accepted. These semantics adopt the closed world assumption
(CWA) i.e. the knowledge base is assumed to contain complete information.
Consequently, a proposition p is considered false whenever it is not entailed
to be true. This type of negation is usually dubbed default negation or weak
negation, to distinguish it from the classical negation used in Classical Logic.
Rules can naturally express assumptions, policies, preferences, norms and
laws, and provide constructs which are more natural for software developers
(as used in Relational Databases and Logic Programming).
3. The open and dynamic character of the Semantic Web requires new knowledge
based systems to be equipped with mechanisms to evolve.
Indeed, the growing availability of information requires the support of dynamic
data and application integration, automation and interoperation of business pro-
cesses and problem-solving in various domains, to enforce correctness of decisions,
and to allow traceability of the knowledge used and of the decisions taken. In these
scenarios, ontologies provide the logical foundation of intelligent access and infor-
mation integration, while rules are used to represent business policies, regulations
and declarative guidelines about information, and mappings between different in-
formation sources.
Over the last decade, there have been many proposals for integrating DL based
monotonic ontologies with nonmonotonic rules (see (Hitzler and Parsia 2009) for
a survey). Recently, in (Motik and Rosati 2007), Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases
were introduced, allowing predicates to be defined concurrently in both an ontol-
ogy and a set of rules, while enjoying several important properties. There is even a
tractable variant based on the well-founded semantics that allows for a top-down
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querying procedure (Alferes et al. 2009), making the approach amenable to practi-
cal applications that need to deal with large ontologies.
But this only addresses part of the problem. The highly dynamic character of the
Semantic Web calls for the development of ways to deal with updates of these hybrid
knowledge bases composed of both rules and ontologies, and the inconsistencies that
may arise. The dynamics of hybrid knowledge bases, to the best of our knowledge,
has never been addressed before.
However, the problems associated with knowledge evolution have been extensively
studied, over the years, by researchers in different research communities, namely
in the context of Classical Logic, and in the context of Logic Programming. They
proved to be extremely difficult to solve, and existing solutions, even within each
community, are still subject of active debate as they do not seem adequate in all
kinds of situations in which their application is desirable.
In the context of Classical Logic, the seminal work by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson (AGM) (Alchourro´n et al. 1985) proposed a set of desirable prop-
erties of belief change operators, now called AGM postulates. Subsequently, in
(Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991), update and revision have been distinguished as
two very related but ultimately different belief change operations. While revi-
sion deals with incorporating new information about a static world, update takes
place when changes occurring in a dynamic world are recorded. The authors of
(Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991) formulated a separate set of postulates for updates.
One of the specific update operators that satisfies these postulates is Winslett’s
minimal change update operator (Winslett 1990). Though we believe that revision
operators for hybrid knowledge bases pose an interesting and important research
topic, in this paper we focus on update operators and do not tackle revision any
further.
Further research showed that, in most cases, belief update operators cannot be
directly applied to Description Logic ontologies. The existing work considers only
ABox updates, allowing only for static acyclic TBoxes which are “expanded” before
the update takes place (Liu et al. 2006), or static general TBoxes in the form of
integrity constraints (Giacomo et al. 2007). The main reasons for these restrictions
were expressibility and computability of the updated ontology. But we believe there
is a more fundamental problem with using belief update operators to update TBoxes
because it frequently yields counterintuitive results, as illustrated here:
Example 1.1 (Counterintuitive TBox update)
Suppose we want to update the description logic TBox T = {B ⊑ A } and we want
to update it with the new information U = {C ⊑ B }. In other words, we introduce
a new subconcept C of concept B. Using Winslett’s update operator we obtain
the updated knowledge base {C ⊑ B,B ⊓ ¬C ⊑ A }. Thus, the subconcept axiom
from T is severely weakened. Using other operators (see (Herzig and Rifi 1999) for
a survey) it may even get completely forgotten. Such a forgetful behaviour cannot
be explained by the sole fact that we are recording a change that occurred in
the modelled environment – new subconcepts may arise without disturbing other
relations the target concept may have.
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Thus, appropriate ways of updating ontologies in general, and TBoxes in partic-
ular, still need to be explored and pose an important open problem on its own. In
our current paper we follow the mentioned ontology update literature and focus on
ABox updates, leaving the TBox static throughout the update process.
Updates were also investigated in the context of Logic Programs. Earlier ap-
proaches based on literal inertia (Marek and Truszczynski 1998) proved not suffi-
ciently expressive for dealing with rule updates, leading to the development of rule
update semantics based on different intuitions, principles and constructions, when
compared to their classical counterparts. For example, the introduction of the causal
rejection principle (Leite and Pereira 1997) lead to several approaches to rule up-
dates (Alferes et al. 2000; Leite 2003; Eiter et al. 2002; Alferes et al. 2005), all of
them with a strong syntactic flavour which makes them very hard to combine with
belief update operators that are semantic in their nature. Other existing approaches
to updates of Logic Programs (Sakama and Inoue 2003; Zhang and Foo 2005; Delgrande et al. 2008)
have different problems, such as, for example, not being immune to tautological up-
dates. It has been shown in (Eiter et al. 2002) that the above mentioned rationality
postulates, set forth in the context of Classical Logic, are inappropriate for dealing
with updates of Logic Programs.
In order to develop an appropriate update operator for hybrid knowledge bases,
one has to somehow combine these apparently irreconcilable approaches to updates,
a problem that is far away from having an appropriate solution.
In this paper, we take an important first step in addressing the updates of hybrid
knowledge bases. Following the state of the art in ontology updates (Liu et al. 2006;
Giacomo et al. 2007), we choose a constrained scenario – which is, nevertheless, rich
enough to encompass many practical applications of hybrid theories – in which only
the ABox is allowed to evolve, while the TBox is kept static. We add rule support to
this scenario by augmenting the traditional immediate consequence operator used
in logic programming with the classical update operator. The resulting framework
is significantly more expressive than those of (Liu et al. 2006; Giacomo et al. 2007)
and allows for a seamless two-way interaction between Logic Programming rules
and Description Logic axioms. The consequences of rules are also subject to update
through the ABox updates, making it possible to use rules to represent default
preferences or behaviour and later directly impose exceptions to those rules.
The resulting update semantics enjoys several desirable properties, namely it:
• generalises the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988).
• generalises, under reasonable assumptions, the MKNF semantics for hybrid
knowledge bases (Motik and Rosati 2007).
• generalises, under reasonable assumptions, the minimal change update oper-
ator (Winslett 1990).
• adheres to the principle of primacy of new information (Dalal 1988), so every
model resulting from the update by an ABox A is a model of A.
• is syntax-independent w.r.t. the TBox and ABox, i.e. yields the same result
with equivalent TBoxes and when updating by equivalent ABoxes.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proposal of an update semantics
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for hybrid knowledge bases in a single framework. This semantics not only provides
an appropriate solution to the constrained scenario we chose, but it unveils a set of
important issues, opening the door for interesting future research endeavours.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Sect. 2 we introduce the
notions needed throughout the rest of the paper, and discuss some of the choices we
made. Section 3 contains the definition of our operator while in Sect. 4 we examine
its properties. In Sect. 5 we conclude and sketch some directions for future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present the necessary preliminaries that we need to define the
hybrid update operator, and discuss some of the choices we made. As the basis
for the formal part of our investigation, we choose the same notation and notions
as those used for Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases (Motik and Rosati 2007). This
makes it possible to treat first-order formulae and nonmonotonic rules in a unified
manner and also compare our semantics to the one of Hybrid MKNF more easily.
2.1 MKNF
The logic of minimal knowledge and negation as failure (MKNF) is an exten-
sion of first-order logic with two modal operators: K and not. In the follow-
ing, we follow the presentation of syntax and semantics of this logic as given in
(Motik and Rosati 2007). We use a function-free first-order syntax extended by the
mentioned modal operators in a natural way. Similarly as in (Motik and Rosati 2007),
we consider only Herbrand interpretations in our semantics.
We begin with the definition of syntax of MKNF formulas. First we need to
introduce the language of MKNF:
Definition 2.1 (MKNF Language)
An MKNF language contains
1. logical connectives ¬ and ∧;
2. the quantifier ∃;
3. modal operators K and not ;
4. punctuation symbols “(”, “)” and “,”;
5. a countably infinite set of variables V = { x,X, y, Y, . . . };
6. a set of constant symbols C = { c, d, . . . } and
7. a set of predicate symbols P = {P,Q, . . . }, each with an associated natural
number that we called its arity.
Each MKNF language is determined by specifying the set of constant symbols C
and the set of predicate symbols P. Such a language is denoted by LMKNF(C,P).
The language is always assumed to contain at least one predicate symbol and at
least one constant symbol.
From now onwards, we assume that the MKNF language L = LMKNF(C,P) is
given and use it implicitly in the text below. Almost all the defined notions are with
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respect to this language but we do not stress this fact in the definitions. So instead
of defining an “MKNF formula of L”, we simply define an “MKNF formula”, leaving
out the words “of L”. Similarly, instead of defining an “MKNF structure over L”,
we simply define an “MKNF structure”, leaving out the words “over L”. Other
definitions follow this pattern as well.
Furthermore, while in the definitions the notions are defined with their full names
(e.g. “MKNF language”, “MKNF formula”, . . . ), further in the text we occasionally
drop the word “MKNF”.We believe these simplifications do not cause any confusion
while significantly improving the readability of the text.
We continue with the definition of an MKNF formula:
Definition 2.2 (MKNF Formula)
A term is a variable or a constant. A first-order atom is every expression of the
form
P (t1, t2, . . . , tn)
where P is a predicate symbol of arity n and each ti is a term.
The set of MKNF formulas is the smallest set satisfying the following conditions:
1. Every first-order atom is an MKNF formula.
2. If φ, ψ are MKNF formulas and x is a variable, then ¬φ, (φ ∧ ψ), (∃x : φ),
Kφ and notφ are also MKNF formulas.
Where it doesn’t cause confusion, the parenthesis are removed for the sake of read-
ability. Furthermore, (φ∨ψ), (φ ⊃ ψ), (φ ⊂ ψ), (φ ≡ ψ), true, false and (∀x : φ) are
used as shortcuts for ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ), (¬φ ∨ψ), (φ ∨¬ψ), (φ ⊃ ψ)∧ (φ ⊂ ψ), (p∨¬p),
(p ∧ ¬p) and ¬(∃x : ¬φ), respectively, where p is a fixed ground first-order atom
from the language.1
An MKNF formula of the form Kφ is called a modal K-atom, and a formula
of the form notφ is called a modal not-atom; collectively, modal K- and not-
atoms are called modal atoms. An MKNF formula φ is a sentence if it has no
free variable occurences; φ is open if all its variable occurences are free; φ is
ground if it does not contain variables; φ is positive if it does not contain oc-
currences of not; φ is first-order or objective if it does not contain modal opera-
tors. By φ[t1/x1, t2/x2, . . . , tn/xn] we denote the formula obtained by simultane-
ously replacing in φ all free occurences of the variable xi by the term ti for every
i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }.
A set of MKNF sentences is an MKNF theory. An MKNF theory has property X
if all its members do (for instance, an MKNF theory is first-order if all sentences
inside it are first-order).
Now we can define the semantics of MKNF formulas. We use Herbrand interpre-
tations, assuming that apart from the constants from C occurring in the formulas,
the signature contains a coutably infinite supply of constants not occurring in the
1 As stated in above, we assume that at least one predicate symbol and at least one constant
symbol exist in the language, from which at least one ground first-order atom can be formed.
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formulas. The Herbrand Universe of such a signature is denoted by ∆ and has
the property C ⊆ ∆. If not stated otherwise, we assume that one fixed Herbrand
Universe ∆ with these properties is used as the universe for all interpretations.
Definition 2.3 (First-Order Interpretation and Model)
A first-order interpretation I is a relational structure that contains for every pred-
icate symbol P ∈ P of arity n a relation P I ⊆ ∆n. The set of all first-order
interpretations is denoted by I.
Each first-order interpretation determines a unique truth assignment to all first-
order sentences. The satisfiability of a first-order sentence φ in I is defined induc-
tively as follows:
1◦ If φ is a ground first-order atom P (c1, c2, . . . , cn), then φ is true in I if and
only if (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ P I ;
2◦ If φ is a first-order formula of the form ¬ψ, then φ is true in I if and only if
ψ is not true in I;
3◦ If φ is a first-order formula of the form φ1 ∧φ2, then φ is true in I if and only
if φ1 is true in I and φ2 is true in I;
4◦ If φ is a first-order formula of the form (∃x : ψ), then φ is true in I if and
only if ψ[c/x] is true in I for some constant c ∈ ∆.
The fact that φ is true in I is denoted by I |= φ. A formula φ is false in I if and
only if it is not true in I, denoted by I 6|= φ. For a first-order theory S we say that
S is true in I, denoted by I |= S, if I |= φ for each φ ∈ S. Otherwise, S is false in
I, denoted by I 6|= S.
If I |= φ, then we say that I is a model of φ. Similarly, if I |= S, then I is a model
of S. The set of all models of φ is denoted by mod(φ). The set of all models of S is
denoted by mod(S).
The satisfiability of MKNF formulas is defined with respect to MKNF structures.
Definition 2.4 (MKNF Structure)
An MKNF structure is a triple 〈I,M,N〉 where I is a first-order interpretation and
M,N are sets of first-order interpretations.2
Every MKNF structure has three components. The first is a first-order interpre-
tation used to interpret the objective parts of a formula. The second and third are
sets of first-order interpretations used to interpret the parts of a formula under the
K and not modality, respectively.
Definition 2.5 (MKNF Satisfiability)
Let 〈I,M,N〉 be an MKNF structure. The satisfiability of an MKNF sentence φ in
〈I,M,N〉 is defined inductively as follows:
1◦ If φ is a ground first-order atom P (c1, c2, . . . , cn), then φ is true in 〈I,M,N〉
if and only if (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ P I ;
2 In difference to (Motik and Rosati 2007), we allow for empty M,N in this definition as later on
it will be useful to have satisfiability defined even for this marginal case. However, the empty
set is still not considered an MKNF interpretation as can be seen further in Definition 2.6
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2◦ If φ is a first-order formula of the form ¬ψ, then φ is true in 〈I,M,N〉 if and
only if ψ is not true in 〈I,M,N〉;
3◦ If φ is a first-order formula of the form φ1 ∧ φ2, then φ is true in 〈I,M,N〉 if
and only if φ1 is true in 〈I,M,N〉 and φ2 is true in 〈I,M,N〉;
4◦ If φ is a first-order formula of the form (∃x : ψ), then φ is true in 〈I,M,N〉
if and only if ψ[c/x] is true in 〈I,M,N〉 for some constant c ∈ ∆;
5◦ If φ is a formula of the form Kψ, then φ is true in 〈I,M,N〉 if and only if ψ
is true in 〈J,M,N〉 for each J ∈M ;
6◦ If φ is a formula of the form notψ, then φ is true in 〈I,M,N〉 if and only if
ψ is not true in 〈J,M,N〉 for some J ∈ N .
The fact that φ is true in 〈I,M,N〉 is denoted by 〈I,M,N〉 |= φ. A formula φ is
false in 〈I,M,N〉 if and only if it is not true in 〈I,M,N〉, denoted by 〈I,M,N〉 6|= φ.
Now we are ready to introduce the notions of MKNF interpretation and model.
Definition 2.6 (MKNF Interpretation and Model)
An MKNF interpretation M is a non-empty set of first-order interpretations. By
M = 2I we denote the set of all MKNF interpretations together with the empty
set.
Let φ be an MKNF sentence, S an MKNF theory and M ∈M. We say φ is true
in M , denoted by M |= φ, if 〈I,M,M〉 |= φ for each I ∈ M .3 Otherwise φ is false
in M , denoted by M 6|= φ. S is true in M , denoted by M |= S, if M |= φ for each
φ ∈ S. Otherwise, S is false in M , denoted by M 6|= S.
If M ∈ M is non-empty4, then M is
• an S5 model of φ if M |= φ;
• an S5 model of S if M |= S;
• an MKNF model of φ if M is an S5 model of φ and for every MKNF inter-
pretation M ′ )M there is some I ′ ∈M ′ such that 〈I ′,M ′,M〉 6|= φ;
• an MKNF model of S if M is an S5 model of S and for every MKNF in-
terpretation M ′ ) M there is some I ′ ∈ M ′ and some φ ∈ S such that
〈I ′,M ′,M〉 6|= φ.
If there exists the greatest S5 model of φ, then it is denoted by mod(φ). If φ has
no S5 model, then mod(φ) denotes the empty set. For the rest of MKNF sentences,
mod(·) stays undefined. If there exists the greatest S5 model of S, then it is denoted
by mod(S). If S has no S5 model, then mod(S) denotes the empty set. For the rest
of MKNF theories, mod(·) stays undefined.
3 Notice that ifM is empty, this condition is vacuously satisfied for any sentence φ, so any sentence
is true in ∅.
4 As seen above, every formula is true in ∅, so ∅ is not considered an MKNF interpretation and
for the same reason it is never given the status of a model.
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2.2 Description Logics
Description Logics (DLs) (Baader et al. 2003) are (mostly) decidable fragments of
first-order logic that are frequently used for knowledge representation in practical
applications. In the following we assume that some Description Logic is used to
describe an ontology. We do not choose any specific Description Logic, we only
assume that the ontology expressed in it is composed of two distinguishable parts:
a TBox with concept and role definitions using the constructs of the underlying
description logic, and an ABox with individual assertions, i.e. assertions of the form
C(a) and R(a, b) where a, b are constants, C is a concept expression and R is a role
expression of the un derlying description logic. This distinction is important to us
as we treat the two types of knowledge in different ways – the TBox is considered
static while the ABox is allowed to evolve. As was noted in the introduction, our
main reason for this is that we believe existing update operators to be unsuitable
for updating concept definitions contained in the TBox. We also assume that the
axioms of the underlying DL can be translated into first-order logic and for the sake
of simplicity we assume that the TBox and ABox already contain these translations
instead of the syntactic constructs of the underlying DL.
2.3 Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases
We make use of the general MKNF framework to give a semantics to hybrid knowl-
edge bases composed of an ontology and a normal logic program. The following
definition introduces the notion of a rule as we use it in the following:
Definition 2.7 (Rule)
A rule is any open MKNF formula of the form
K p ⊂ K q1 ∧K q2 ∧ · · · ∧K qk ∧ not s1 ∧ not s2 ∧ · · · ∧ not sl (1)
where k, l are non-negative integers and p, qi, sj are first-order atoms for any i ∈
{ 1, 2, . . . , k } , j ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , l }. Given a rule r of the form (1), the following notation
is also defined:
H(r) = K p ,
H∗(r) = p ,
B+(r) = {K q1,K q2, . . . ,K qk } ,
B−(r) = { not s1,not s2, . . . ,not sl } ,
B(r) = B+(r) ∪B−(r) .
H(r) is dubbed the head of r, H∗(r) the first-order head of r, B+(r) the positive
body of r, B−(r) the negative body of r and B(r) the body of r. A rule r is called
definite if its negative body is empty. A rule r is called a fact if its body is empty.
A program is a set of rules. A definite program is a set of definite rules.
As was shown in (Lifschitz 1991), the MKNF semantics generalises the stable
model semantics for logic programs. In particular, every logic programming rule of
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the form
p← q1, q2, . . . , qk, not s1, not s2, . . . , not sl.
can be translated into the MKNF formula (1) and the stable models of sets of such
rules (i.e. of normal logic programs) directly correspond to MKNF models of the
set of translated rules.
We are now ready to define a hybrid knowledge base and its semantics.
Definition 2.8 (Hybrid knowledge base)
Let O be an ontology and P a program. The pair K = 〈O,P〉 is then called a hybrid
knowledge base. We say K is definite if P is definite and we say K is P-ground if P
is ground.
The semantics of hybrid knowledge bases is given in terms of a translation pi into
a set of MKNF formulas which is defined as follows:
Definition 2.9
For an ontology O, a rule r with the vector of free variables x, a program P and
the hybrid knowledge base K = 〈O,P〉, we define:
pi(O) = {Kφ | φ ∈ O } ,
pi(r) = (∀x : r) ,
pi(P) = { pi(r) | r ∈ P } ,
pi(K) = pi(O) ∪ pi(P) .
We say an MKNF interpretation M is an S5 model of K if M is an S5 model of
pi(K). We say M is an MKNF model of K if M is an MKNF model of pi(K).
In this paper, we are not concerned with decidability of reasoning, so we refrain
from introducing a safety condition on our rules as was done in (Motik and Rosati 2007).
2.4 Classical Updates
As a basis for our update operator, we adopt an update semantics called the
minimal change update semantics (sometimes also called the possible models ap-
proach (PMA)) as defined in (Winslett 1990) for updating first-order theories.
There are a number of reasons for this choice. First, it satisfies all of Katsuno
and Mendelzon’s update postulates (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991). This means,
for instance, that unlike some other update semantics, such as the standard seman-
tics (Winslett 1990), it is not sensitive to syntax of the original theory or of the
update. Second, it is based on an intuitive idea, treating each classical model of the
original theory as a possible world and modifying it as little as possible in order to
become consistent with the new information. This idea has its roots in reasoning
about action (Winslett 1988) and updates of relational theories (Winslett 1990).
Third, the operator has already been successfully used to deal with ABox updates
(Liu et al. 2006; Giacomo et al. 2007).
This semantics uses a notion of closeness of first-order interpretations w.r.t. a
fixed first-order interpretation I. This notion is based on the set of ground first-
order atoms that are interpreted differently than in I.
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Definition 2.10 (Interpretation distance)
Let P be a predicate symbol and I, J be first-order interpretations. The difference in
the interpretation of P between I and J , written diff (P, I, J), is a relation containing
the set of tuples (P I \ P J) ∪ (P J \ P I).
Given first-order interpretations I, J, J ′, we say that J is at least as close to I as
J ′, denoted by J ≤I J ′, if for every predicate symbol P it holds that diff (P, I, J)
is a subset of diff (P, I, J ′). We also say that J is closer to I than J ′, denoted by
J <I J
′, if J ≤I J ′ and J ′ I J .
We now give a definition of the minimal change update semantics but in difference
to (Winslett 1990), we use a specific vocabulary which is closer to the setting of
this paper. In particular, we define the semantics of updating an initial theory S by
an ABox A in the context of the TBox T . The TBox is treated as static integrity
constraints for the whole update process. The minimal change update semantics
chooses those models of T ∪ A that are the closest w.r.t. the relation ≤I to some
model I of T ∪ S. Formally:
Definition 2.11 (Winslett’s minimal change update semantics)
Let S be a first-order theory, T a TBox, A an ABox, I a first-order interpretation
and M a set of first-order interpretations. We define:
incorporateT (A, I) = { J ∈ mod(T ∪ A) | (∄J ′ ∈ mod(T ∪ A))(J ′ <I J) } ,
incorporateT (A,M) =
⋃
I∈M
incorporateT (A, I) ,
mod(S ⊕T A) = incorporateT (A,mod(T ∪ S)) .
If mod(S⊕T A) is nonempty, we call it the minimal change update model of S⊕T A.
The previous definition can be naturally generalised to allow for sequences of
ABoxes. Starting from the models of the original theory, for each ABox in the
sequence we transform the set of models according to the minimal change update
semantics defined above. The resulting set of models then determines the updated
theory. Formally:
Definition 2.12 (Update by a sequence of ABoxes)
Let S be a first-order theory, T a TBox,A = (A1,A2, . . . ,An) a sequence of ABoxes
and M a set of first-order interpretations. We inductively define:
incorporateT (A,M) = incorporateT ((A2, . . . ,An), incorporate
T (A1,M)) ,
mod(S ⊕T A) = incorporateT (A,mod(T ∪ S)) .
If mod(S⊕T A) is nonempty, we call it the minimal change update model of S⊕T A.
3 Hybrid Update Operator
Turning to the formal part of our proposal, our aim is to propose a semantics for
a program P updated by a sequence of ABoxes (A1,A2, . . . ,An) in the context of
a TBox T . We assume program P to be finite and ground, a common assumption
when dealing with reasoning under the stable model semantics.
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We follow a path similar to how the stable models of normal logic programs were
originally defined (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988), and start by defining how a definite
program can be updated by a sequence of ABoxes, and only afterwards deal with
programs containing default negation.
As with the least model of a definite logic program, our resulting model is the
least fixed point of an immediate consequence operator. Our operator is in a way
similar to the usual immediate consequence operator TP commonly used to draw
consequences from a logic program P . The crucial difference between TP and our
operator is that in the latter, the consequences are subsequently updated by the
sequence of ABoxes A using the classical update operator. Formally:
Definition 3.1 (Updating immediate consequence operator TP⊕TA)
Let P be a finite ground definite program, T a TBox and A a sequence of ABoxes.
We define the operator TP⊕TA for any M ⊆ I as follows
5:
TP⊕TA(M) = mod({H
∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) } ⊕T A)
An important property of an immediate consequence operator is continuity be-
cause it guarantees the existence of a least fixed point and also provides a way
of computing this least fixed point (using the Kleene Fixed Point Theorem). The
TP⊕TA operator satisfies the condition of continuity:
Proposition 3.2 (Continuity of TP⊕TA)
Let P be a finite ground definite program, T a TBox and A a sequence of ABoxes.
Then TP⊕TA is a continuous function on the complete partial order (M,⊇).
Proof
See Appendix Appendix D, page 34.
Now we can define a minimal change dynamic stable model of P ⊕T A, where P
is a definite program, as the least fixed point of TP⊕TA:
Definition 3.3 (Minimal change dynamic stable model for definite programs)
Let P be a finite ground definite program, T a TBox and A a sequence of ABoxes.
We say an MKNF interpretation M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of
P ⊕T A if it is the least fixed point of TP⊕TA.
Notice that for every definite program P and each sequence of ABoxes A, P⊕T A
has either no minimal change dynamic stable model (when the least fixed point of
TP⊕TA is empty), or exactly one minimal change dynamic stable model.
In order to deal with default negation in the bodies of rules, we use the Gelfond-
Lifschitz transformation which was used to define the stable models of a normal logic
program (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988). We do this by defining the definite program
PM which is the result of performing the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation on P –
rules from P with a negative body that is in conflict with M are discarded, while
5 Recall that M |= B(r) holds if and only if M is an S5 model of every modal atom in B(r) (see
also Def. 2.6).
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for all the other rules, their negative bodies are discarded. Then PM is updated by
A using the above definition for definite logic programs and if the result is identical
toM , thenM is given the status of a minimal change dynamic stable model. Hence,
the resulting operator can be used to update an arbitrary normal logic program by
a sequence of ABoxes.
Definition 3.4 (Minimal change dynamic stable model)
Let P be a finite ground program, T a TBox, A a sequence of ABoxes and M
an MKNF interpretation. We say M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of
P ⊕T A if M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of PM ⊕T A where
PM =
{
H(r) ⊂ B+(r)
∣∣ r ∈ P ∧M |= B−(r) } .
The minimal change dynamic stable models can be used to define a consequence
relation from P ⊕T A where P is a finite ground program, T is a TBox and A
a sequence of ABoxes. We offer a definition which adopts a skeptical approach to
inference, credulous and other definitions may be obtained similarly.
Definition 3.5 (Consequence relation)
Let P be a finite ground program, T a TBox, A a sequence of ABoxes and φ an
MKNF sentence. We say that P ⊕T A entails φ, written P ⊕T A |= φ, if and only
if M |= φ for all minimal change dynamic stable models M of P ⊕T A.
We now demonstrate the defined update semantics on a simple example:
Example 3.6
Consider the following TBox T and program P :
T : A ≡ B ⊔C (2)
NegA ≡ ¬A (3)
D ≡ ¬A ⊓ ∃P−.A (4)
P : NegA(X)← not A(X). (5)
P (X,Y )← A(X), E(Y ), not E(X). (6)
TBox assertions (2) and (3) together with rule (5) define the concept A as a union
of concepts B and C and they make this concept interpreted under CWA instead of
OWA, i.e. whenever for some constant c we cannot conclude that A(c) is true, the
rule (5) infers NegA(c) and by (3) we obtain ¬A(c). Assertion (4) defines concept
D as those members d of ¬A for which there exists some c from A with P (c, d).
Rule (6) infers the relation P (c, d) whenever c is in A but not in E and d is in E.
Given the initial definitions, an update by A1 = {A(c) } now yields6
P ⊕T A1 |= {A(c),¬A(d) } .
A further update by A2 = {¬B(c) } introduces a possibility of A(c) not being true
6 In the example we assume that the rules are grounded using all constants explicitly mentioned
in the knowledge base. In this case there are only two: c and d.
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in case B(c) was true before and C(c) was false. Since A is interpreted under the
closed world assumption, we can now conclude that A(c) is false:
P ⊕T (A1,A2) |= {¬A(c),¬B(c),¬A(d) }
Consider now the update A3 = {C(c) ∧ E(d) }. Given (2), this reinstates A(c).
Furthermore, rule (6) can now infer P (c, d) and by (3) we obtain D(d):
P ⊕T (A1,A2,A3) |= {A(c),¬B(c), C(c),¬A(d), E(d), P (c, d), D(d) }
In the next update A4 = {E(c) } we block the body of rule (6), which also prevents
D(d) from being inferred:
P ⊕T (A1,A2,A3,A4) |= {A(c),¬B(c), C(c),¬A(d), E(d), E(c) }
The last update7 A5 = {¬E(c) ∧ ¬P (c, d) } illustrates how the conclusion of a rule
may be overridden through the ABox updates – though the body of rule (6) is true,
its head does not become true since it is in direct conflict with A5:
P ⊕T (A1,A2,A3,A4,A5) |= {A(c),¬B(c), C(c),¬A(d), E(d),¬E(c),¬P (c, d) }
4 Properties and Relations
In this section we investigate a number of formal properties of the defined operator.
The first property guarantees that every minimal change dynamic stable model of
P⊕TA is a model ofA. This is known as the principle of primacy of new information
(Dalal 1988).
Proposition 4.1 (Primacy of new information)
Let P be a finite ground program, T a TBox, A an ABox andM a minimal change
dynamic stable model of P ⊕T A. Then M |= A.
Proof
See Appendix Appendix D, page 35.
The second property guarantees that our operator is syntax-independent w.r.t.
the TBox and the updating ABox. This is a desirable property as it shows that
providing equivalent TBoxes and updating by equivalent ABoxes always produces
the same result. It is inherited from the classical minimal change update operator.
Proposition 4.2 (Syntax independence)
Let P be a finite ground program, T , T ′ be TBoxes such that mod(T ) = mod(T ′),
A,A′ be ABoxes such that mod(A) = mod(A′) andM be an MKNF interpretation.
Then M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of P ⊕T A if and only if M is
a minimal change dynamic stable model of P ⊕T
′
A′.
7 Updating ABoxes could, of course, be more complex since arbitrary concept expressions may
be used (e.g. (∃P.C)(c)). Here, due to limited space, we keep the example very simple.
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Proof
See Appendix Appendix D, page 35.
The following proposition relates the hybrid update operator to the static MKNF
semantics of hybrid knowledge bases. It gives sufficient conditions for the static and
dynamic semantics to coincide. In particular, the sufficient condition requires that
for any set of consequences S of program P in the context of a model M , updating
S by A in the context of T has the same effect as making an intersection of the
models of S with the models of A and T .
Proposition 4.3 (Relation to Hybrid MKNF )
Let P be a finite ground program, O = T ∪ A an ontology with TBox T and
ABox A and M an MKNF interpretation such that for every subset S of the set
{H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) } the following condition is satisfied:
mod(S ⊕T A) = mod(S ∪ O) .
ThenM is an MKNF model of 〈O,P〉 if and only ifM is a minimal change dynamic
stable model of P ⊕T A.
Proof
See Appendix Appendix D, page 36.
The precondition of this proposition is satisfied, for example, when predicates
appearing in heads of P do not appear in the ontology O. An important subcase
of this is when O is empty because then the proposition implies that the minimal
change dynamic stable models of P ⊕∅ ∅ are exactly the MKNF models of P . Since
the MKNF semantics generalises the stable model semantics (Lifschitz 1991), the
minimal change dynamic stable models of P ⊕∅ ∅ also coincide with the stable
models of P . In other words, our operator properly generalises stable models.
Corollary 4.4 (Generalisation of stable models)
Let P be a finite ground program. Then M is a stable model of P if and only if M
is a minimal change dynamic stable model of P ⊕∅ ∅.
Proof
See Appendix Appendix D, page 37.
Turning to relations with the minimal change update operator, we show that up-
dating any logic program that can be equivalently translated into first-order logic
has the same effect as updating the translated first-order theory using the mini-
mal change update operator. Hence, our update operator generalises the classical
minimal change update operator.
Proposition 4.5 (Generalisation of the minimal change update operator)
Let P be a finite ground program containing only facts, T a TBox, A a sequence
of ABoxes and M an MKNF interpretation. Then M is a minimal change dynamic
stable model of P ⊕T A if and only if M is a minimal change update model of
SP ⊕
T A where SP = { p | K p ∈ P }.
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Proof
See Appendix Appendix D, page 38.
Another property that our operator inherits from the classical minimal change
update operator is that empty ABoxes in the updating sequence do not influence
the resulting models. Similarly, updating an empty program simply yields the set of
all first-order models of T ∪A. These last two properties ensure that empty program
and updates cannot influence the resulting models under our update operator8.
Proposition 4.6 (Indifference to empty updates)
Let P be a finite ground program, T be a TBox and A = (A1,A2, . . . ,An) a
sequence of ABoxes (where n ≥ 1). Let
A′ = (A1,A2, . . . ,Ai−1,Ai, ∅,Ai+1, . . . ,An)
for some i ∈ { 0, 1, 2, . . . , n }. Then an MKNF interpretationM is a minimal change
dynamic stable model of P ⊕T A if and only if M is a minimal change dynamic
stable model of P ⊕T A′.
Proof
See Appendix Appendix D, page 37.
Proof
See Appendix Appendix D, page 40.
Proposition 4.7 (Updating an empty program)
Let T be a TBox, A an ABox and M an MKNF interpretation. Then M is a
minimal change dynamic stable model of ∅ ⊕T A if and only if M = mod(T ∪ A).
Relation to Katsuno and Mendelzon’s postulates
In the following we briefly discuss the relation of our operator to Katsuno and
Mendelzon’s postulates for updates of propositional knowledge bases formulated
in (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991). Each propositional knowledge base over a finite
language can be represented by a single propositional formula and the result of
the update can also be represented as a propositional formula. The eight desirable
properties of an update operator ⋄ are as follows:
KM 1: φ ⋄ ψ implies ψ.
KM 2: If φ implies ψ, then φ ⋄ ψ is equivalent to φ.
KM 3: If both φ and ψ are satisfiable, then φ ⋄ ψ is satisfiable.
KM 4: If φ1 is equivalent to φ2 and ψ1 is equivalent to ψ2, then φ1 ⋄ ψ1 is
equivalent to φ2 ⋄ ψ2.
KM 5: (φ ⋄ ψ) ∧ χ implies φ ⋄ (ψ ∧ χ).
8 Perhaps surprisingly, as shown in (Leite 2003), these two properties are violated by many update
operators in the context of Logic Programming.
Towards Closed World Reasoning in Dynamic Open Worlds 17
KM 6: If φ ⋄ ψ1 implies ψ2 and φ ⋄ ψ2 implies ψ1, then φ ⋄ ψ1 is equivalent to
φ ⋄ ψ2.
KM 7: If for each atom p either φ implies p or φ implies ¬p, then (φ⋄ψ1)∧(φ⋄ψ2)
implies φ ⋄ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2).
KM 8: (φ1 ∨ φ2) ⋄ ψ is equivalent to (φ1 ⋄ ψ) ∨ (φ2 ⋄ ψ).
In order to examine these postulates in our setting, we restrict our attention to
a finite propositional language. In order to interpret the postulates in our setting,
we need to define the semantics of a number of notions used in them. Let P ,P1,P2
be programs, T a TBox and α, α1, α2 be propositional formulae representing ABox
updates. We need to discuss and define, at least:
1. When does P ⊕T α1 imply α2? (used in KM 1 and KM 6)
2. When does P imply α? (used in KM 2 and KM 7)
3. When is P1 ⊕T α equivalent to P2? (used in KM 2)
4. When is P satisfiable? (used in KM 3)
5. When is P ⊕T α satisfiable? (used in KM 3)
6. When is P1 equivalent to P2? (used in KM 4)
7. When is P1 ⊕T α1 equivalent to P2 ⊕T α2? (used in KM 4 and KM 6)
8. What is the semantics of (P ⊕T α1) ∧ α2? (used in KM 5)
9. What is the semantics of (P ⊕T α1) ∧ (P ⊕T α2)? (used in KM 7)
10. What is the semantics of P1 ∨ P2? (used in KM 8)
Most of these questions can be answered in multiple different ways while some of
them are hard to provide answers to at all. In the following, we suggest ways of
answering most of these questions and then analyse whether our operator satisfies
the corresponding postulates.
Question 1. can be answered using the consequence relation from Def. 3.5. A
similar consequence relation can be defined using stable models to answer question
2. A simple answer to question 3. is to say that P1 ⊕T α is equivalent to P2 if the
set of minimal change dynamic stable models of P1⊕T α is equal to the set of stable
models of P2. Regarding questions 4. and 5., we can say that P is satisfiable if it
has at least one stable model and P⊕T α is satisfiable if it has at least one minimal
change dynamic stable model. Question 6. can be answered similarly as question
3. by comparing the sets of minimal change dynamic stable models of P ⊕T α1
and P ⊕T α2. Finally, question 7. can be answered by comparing the sets of stable
models of P1 and P2 or by using strong equivalence (Lifschitz et al. 2001). Providing
reasonable answers to the remaining questions requires more investigation, so, for
now, we do not further examine postulates KM 5, KM 7 and KM 8.
Turning to the rest of the postulates, we note that our operator adheres to KM 1,
which was proved in Proposition 4.1. The same is not the case with postulate KM 2,
as shown by the following counterexample. Consider the program
P : p← not q. r← q, not r.
q ← not p. r← p.
(7)
and an update α = r. The only stable model of P is the maximal S5 model M of
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{ p, r }. Clearly, M |= α. But P ⊕T α has another minimal change dynamic stable
M ′, which is the maximal S5 model of { q, r } and so is not equivalent to P .
In fact, this behaviour is inherited from the stable semantics for logic programs
which does not satisfy the very similar property of cumulativity (Makinson 1988;
Dix 1995). Hence, it is expectable that KM 2 is never satisfied by any update
semantics that properly generalises the stable model semantics.
A similar situation arises with postulate KM 3 because the stable model semantics
allows to express integrity constraints, and these may easily be broken by an update.
For example, the program P = { p← q, not p. }, updated by α = q, of which both
are satisfiable, does not allow for any minimal change dynamic stable model. It is
not clear how an integrity constraint should be updated because, once it is a part of
the knowledge base, which is assumed to be a correct representation of the world, it
should not be violated, and no new information should have the power to override
it. Or should it? That is another open research question worth investigating.
Postulate KM 4 is partially formulated in Proposition 4.2, which shows that
updating by equivalent ABoxes produces the same result. The other half amounts
to proving that updating equivalent logic programs by the same ABox also produces
equivalent results. For the two notions of program equivalence that we proposed
above, this property does not hold. As a counterexample take P1 = { p., q. } and
P2 = { p., q ← p. } which have the same answer sets and are also strongly equivalent.
An update by α = ¬p, produces different results for P1 and P2, respectively, which
we believe is in accord with intuitions regarding these two programs. It may be the
case that for different notions of program equivalence that better suit our scenario,
such as the update equivalence of logic programs proposed in (Leite 2003), this
property holds. Further investigation is needed to answer this question.
Finally, postulate KM 6 is also not satisfied by the operator. As a counterex-
ample we can take the program P defined in (7), α1 = r and α2 = p ∨ q. Then
P ⊕T α1 has two minimal change dynamic stable models: M1 = mod({ p, r }) and
M2 = mod({ q, r }). Hence, P ⊕T α1 |= α2. Furthermore, P⊕T α2 has only one min-
imal change dynamic stable model which is M1 and consequently P ⊕T α2 |= α1.
However, P ⊕T α1 is not equivalent to P ⊕T α2.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
As seen, our operator properly generalises the two main ingredients that it is mo-
tivated by – the stable model semantics of normal logic programs (Corollary 4.4)
and the minimal change update operator (Proposition 4.5). The failure of our op-
erator to satisfy many of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s postulates is not surprising. A
wide range of classical update and revision postulates was already studied in the
context of rule updates, only to find that many of them were inappropriate for
characterising plausible rule update operators (Eiter et al. 2002). Furthermore, in
(Slota and Leite 2010) we show that even under the SE model semantics, which is
strictly more expressive than stable models semantics, update operators satisfying
only some of the basic Katsuno and Mendelzon’s postulates necessarily violate the
property of support which is at the core of most logic programming semantics. The
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search for desirable properties of hybrid update operators is an interesting future
research area.
There are also many more properties still to be examined, among them decid-
ability as well as complexity of reasoning. Since we cannot expect the operator to
perform any better than the stable model semantics and the classical update oper-
ator it is based on, its tractable approximations need to be defined and examined.
The well-founded semantics for logic programs (Gelder et al. 1991) and its version
for hybrid MKNF knowledge bases (Alferes et al. 2009) constitute crucial starting
points. The recent research on ontology evolution (see (Flouris et al. 2008) for a
survey) can help design tractable update operators which, at the same time, offer
the necessary functionality to be interesting for use in practice.
In this paper, the TBox was considered static and was treated in the same
way as integrity constraints in (Winslett 1990). This approach to handling in-
tegrity constraints in the context of updates has been criticized in the literature
(Herzig and Rifi 1999; Herzig 2005), as in certain cases it does not provide the
expected results. However, the proposed solutions are defined only for the proposi-
tional case and a preliminary examination showed that their treatment of equiva-
lences, such as the TBox definitions used in Example 3.6, is not always the expected
one. Further investigation is needed to find suitable solutions to these problems in
the context of ontology updates. Furthermore, in truly dynamic environments, the
TBox should also be allowed to be updated. We believe that finding appropriate
update operators for ontologies is still a largely open research question.
The large body of work on rule updates (Leite 2003; Alferes et al. 2005), and
more recently (Delgrande et al. 2008), also needs to be exploited in the attempts
to define an update operator that can deal with the evolution of both rules and
ontologies.
Finally, while incorporating new knowledge in a knowledge base is important,
the complementary task of removing a certain piece of information is also impor-
tant. Hence, hybrid erasure operators should be studied and related to hybrid up-
date operators. The work on erasure (Giacomo et al. 2007) in description logics as
well as forgetting in both description logics (Wang et al. 2009) and logic programs
(Eiter and Wang 2008) should be the starting points of this research.
To conclude, in this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we proposed the first
update operator for hybrid knowledge bases. We deal with a constrained but inter-
esting scenario in which a TBox and nonmonotonic rules represent static knowledge,
policies, norms and default preferences, and the evolving ABox represents the open
and dynamic environment. We illustrated the behaviour of our operator on a simple
example. The operator can be used in realistic scenarios where the general notions
and rules are relatively fixed, and individuals tend to change their state frequently.
This is the case of many real life institutions where stakeholders change their state
on a regular basis while the general rules and structures change only occasionally.
We proved a number of properties of our operator, among which its relations
with the theories it was based on, such as the stable model semantics for logic pro-
grams (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988), the MKNF semantics for hybrid knowledge
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bases (Motik and Rosati 2007) and Winslett’s minimal change update operator
(Winslett 1990).
We believe that this new area of research brings exciting new problems to solve
and bridges a number of existing research areas. It will certainly provide useful
results for many applications and perhaps even contribute to finding further philo-
sophical insights into how human knowledge evolves.
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Appendix A Kleene Fixed Point Theorem
Fixed points play an important role in many of the investigations in the area of
logic programming. Many semantics of logic programs are defined by a fixed point
equation, meaning that in order for an interpretationM to be considered a “good”
model of a logic program, it must satisfy some equation of the form M = f(M)
where f is a mapping from interpretations to interpretations, also called an opera-
tor. Such operators were heavily studied in Order Theory and Kleene Fixed Point
Theorem is one of its basic results. Informally, it states that the least fixed point
of a continuous operator can be computed by iterating the operator. It is heavily
used in logic programming.
For the sake of self-containedness, this Appendix introduces the basic notions
of Order Theory necessary to formally state and prove the Kleene Fixed Point
Theorem. For an elaborate study of this topic with many further references, we
refer the reader to (Davey and Priestley 1990).
The first definition is of a partially ordered set, under which we mean any set
with an associated relation “≤” that can be used to compare elements of this set.
This relation is required to obey certain properties that can be naturally expected
from any such ordering relation.
Definition A.1 (Partial Order)
A partial order is a pair (P,≤) where P is a set and ≤ is a reflexive, antisymetric and
transitive relation over P , i.e. the following conditions are satisfied for all a, b, c ∈ P :
a ≤ a
(a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ a)⇒ a = b
(a ≤ b ∧ b ≤ c)⇒ a ≤ c
We also say that P is a partially ordered set (w.r.t. ≤).
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In logic programming, the set of interpretations usually forms a partial order
that is usually ordered by the subset relation. In case of MKNF interpretations, the
partial order is determined by the superset relation.
The following definitions introduce the least and greatest elements and lower and
upper bounds of a subset of a partially ordered set.
Definition A.2 (Least and Greatest Element)
Let P be a partially ordered set, S ⊆ P and a ∈ S. Then a is the least element of
S if for every b ∈ S it holds that a ≤ b, and a is the greatest element of S if for
every b ∈ S it holds that b ≤ a.
Definition A.3 (Lower and Upper Bound)
Let P be a partially ordered set, S ⊆ P and a ∈ P . Then a is a lower bound of S if
for every b ∈ S it holds that a ≤ b, and a is an upper bound of S if for every b ∈ S
it holds that b ≤ a.
Combining the previous notions, we obtain the notion of a least upper bound
(supremum) and greatest lower bound (infimum).
Definition A.4 (Supremum and Infimum)
Let P be a partially ordered set, S ⊆ P and a ∈ P . Then a is the supremum of S,
denoted by a = sup(S), if it is the least element of the set of upper bounds of S,
and a is the infimum of S, denoted by a = inf(S), if it is the greatest element of
the set of lower bounds of S
The next notion of a directed set plays an important role in defining when a
function on a partial order is continuous. It is also required in order to define
a stricter structure than a partial order, the complete partial order. We need to
introduce both these notions in order to formulate the Kleene Fixed Point Theorem
which describes one property of continuous functions on complete partial orders.
Definition A.5 (Directed Set)
A directed set is a pair (D,≤) where D is a non-empty set, ≤ is a reflexive and
transitive relation over D and for any elements a, b ∈ D there exists some c ∈ D
such that a ≤ c and b ≤ c.
As can be seen, in a directed set, every pair of elements has an upper bound that
also belongs to the set. This property can be naturally extended to finite subsets
of the directed set.
Proposition A.6
Let (D,≤) be a directed set and S a finite subset of D. Then D contains an upper
bound of S.
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Proof
Suppose S = { s1, s2, . . . , sn }. Then we can construct a sequence {di}ni=2 of elements
of D such that
s1 ≤ d2 and s2 ≤ d2 ;
si ≤ di and di−1 ≤ di for each i ∈ { 3, 4, . . . , n } .
By induction on i it follows that di ≤ dn for every i ∈ { 2, 3, . . . , n } and by applying
transitivity we obtain si ≤ dn for each i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n }. Hence dn is an upper bound
of S in D.
As an important consequence, we obtain that every finite directed set contains
its own supremum.
Corollary A.7
Any finite directed set contains its supremum.
Proof
Let (D,≤) be a finite directed set. Then by Prop. A.6 it contains its own upper
bound d. Consider some other upper bound u of D. Then since d ∈ D, we have
d ≤ u and so d is the least upper bound of D, i.e. the supremum of D.
We can now introduce two properties of functions on partial orders. the weaker
property of monotonicity basically states that the function preserves the partial
order:
Definition A.8 (Monotonic Function)
Let P,Q be two partially ordered sets and f : P → Q. We say f is monotonic if for
every a, b ∈ P such that a ≤ b we have f(a) ≤ f(b).
The property of continuity is stricter and requires that for all directed sets with a
supremum in the domain, the image of that supremum is the same as the supremum
of images of elements of the directed set.
Definition A.9 (Continuous Function)
Let P,Q be two partially ordered sets and f : P → Q. We say f is continuous if
for every directed subset D of P with supremum in P it holds that
sup(f(D)) = f(sup(D))
where f(A) = { f(a) | a ∈ A } for any set A ⊆ P .
The next proposition formally proves that continuity is a stronger property thatn
monotonicity.
Proposition A.10
Every continuous function is monotonic.
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Proof
Consider a continuous function f : P → Q and some a, b ∈ P such that a ≤ b. Then
the set D = { a, b } is a directed subset of P and by continuity of f we obtain
sup(f(D)) = f(sup(D))
Since sup(D) = b, we further obtain sup({ f(a), f(b) }) = f(b) and consequently
f(a) ≤ f(b) as desired.
A complete partial is simply a partial order with a least element in which every
directed set has a supremum. Many partially ordered structures, such as the space
of interpretations, satisfy this property.
Definition A.11 (Complete Partial Order)
A partial order (P,≤) is a complete partial order if P has a least element and every
directed subset S of P has a supremum in P .
Finally, we are able to formulate and prove the main result of this appendix. It
states that the least fixed point of a continuous function on a complete partial order
always exists and can be approximated by iterations of the function applied to the
least element of the complete partial order.
Theorem A.12 (Kleene Fixed Point Theorem)
Let P be a complete partial order with the least element ⊥ and f be a continuous
function on P . Then the least fixed point of f is sup { fn(⊥) | n ≥ 0 }.
Proof
This is a well-established result, even so much that it is not easy to find its original
source. The oldest source we were able to find and verify is the book (Stoy 1977),
pp. 112, Theorem 6.64. The same proof is also presented in the paper (Stoy 1979),
pp. 55 (according to the numbering of the Proceedings). A more recent book on
this topic is (Davey and Priestley 1990) where this result is formulated as Theorem
4.5 on pp. 89.
Now we start with the presentation of the proof. Suppose f is a continuous
function on the complete partial order P . Then by Proposition A.10 it is monotonic
from which it follows easily that the set D = { fn(⊥) | n ≥ 0 } is directed. Hence,
its supremum supD exists in P . We will now show that supD is a fixed point of f :
f(supD) = sup f(D) = sup f({ fn(⊥) | n ≥ 0 }) = sup { fn(⊥) | n ≥ 1 } =
= sup({⊥ } ∪ { fn(⊥) | n ≥ 1 }) = sup { fn(⊥) | n ≥ 0 } =
= supD
Further, suppose a is some fixed point of f . In order to prove that supD is the least
fixed point of f , we need to show that supD ≤ a. By induction on n we can easily
obtain that fn(⊥) ≤ a for all n ≥ 0:
1◦ f0(⊥) = ⊥ ≤ a
2◦ By inductive assumption fn−1(⊥) ≤ a, so by monotonicity of f we obtain fn(⊥) ≤
f(a) = a.
So a is an upper bound of D and, by definition of a supremum, supD ≤ a as
desired.
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Appendix B Properties of MKNF
B.1 General Properties
Lemma B.1 (Models of Positive Sentences)
Let φ be a positive MKNF sentence, I a propositional interpretation and M,N0 ∈
M. If 〈I,M,N0〉 |= φ, then 〈I,M,N〉 |= φ for any N ∈ M.
Proof
Follows directly from Definition 2.6 and the fact that the valuation of a positive
formula in a structure 〈I,M,N〉 is independent of N .
Corollary B.2
Let φ be a positive MKNF sentence. Then the MKNF models of φ are exactly the
subset-maximal S5 models of φ.
Proof
Follows from Definition 2.6 and Lemma B.1.
Lemma B.3
Let ≤ be a binary relation defined on the set M of all sets of first-order interpre-
tations for any M,N ∈ M as follows:
M ≤ N ⇐⇒M ⊇ N
Then (M,≤) is a complete partial order with the least element I.
Proof
Follows from the set-theoretic properties of the subset relation ⊆ and of the set
intersection ∩. Notice that even subsets of M that are not directed have their
supremum (intersection) in M.
Lemma B.4
Let φ be an first-order sentence and M,N ∈M be such that M ≤ N . If M |= Kφ,
then also N |= Kφ.
Proof
Suppose M |= Kφ and consider some interpretation I ∈ N . By the assumption
we obtain I ∈ M and so 〈I,M,M〉 |= Kφ. Hence 〈I,M,M〉 |= φ and since φ is a
first-order formula, its valuation in the structure 〈I,M,M〉 doesn’t depend on M ,
so 〈I,N,N〉 |= φ. Furthermore, our choice of I was arbitrary, so we can conclude
that 〈I,N,N〉 |= φ for all I ∈ N . Consequently, N |= Kφ as desired.
B.2 Models of First-Order Theories
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Lemma B.5 (Greatest Model of a First-Order Theory)
For any first-order theory S it holds that
mod(S) = { I ∈ I | (∀φ ∈ S)(I |= φ) }
Proof
We will prove that
MS = { I ∈ I | (∀φ ∈ S)(I |= φ) }
is the greatest set among the sets M ∈M with the property M |= S.
First we need to prove that MS satisfies this property, i.e. that MS |= S. Take
some φ ∈ S and I ∈ MS . Then I |= φ and since φ is first-order, we also obtain
〈I,MS ,MS〉 |= φ. This holds for any I ∈MS , so MS |= φ.
Now let M ∈M be such that M |= S and suppose I ∈M . Then for every φ ∈ S
we must have 〈I,M,M〉 |= φ and since φ is first-order, this entails I |= φ. Hence,
I ∈MS , so M ⊆MS. This fact finishes our proof.
B.3 Relevant Part of an MKNF Interpretation
Definition B.6 (Predicate Symbols Relevant to a Ground Formula)
Given a ground MKNF formula φ, we define the set P[φ] of predicate symbols rele-
vant to φ inductively as follows:
1◦ If φ is a first-order atom P (c1, c2, . . . , cn), then P
[φ] = {P };
2◦ If φ is of the form ¬ψ, then P[φ] = P[ψ];
3◦ If φ is of the form φ1 ∧ φ2, then P[φ] = P[φ1] ∪P[φ2];
4◦ If φ is of the form Kψ, then P[φ] = P[ψ];
5◦ If φ is of the form notψ, then P[φ] = P[ψ].
Definition B.7 (Constant Symbols Relevant to a Ground Formula)
Given a groundMKNF formula φ, we define the set C[φ] of constant symbols relevant
to φ inductively as follows:
1◦ If φ is a first-order atom P (c1, c2, . . . , cn), then C
[φ] = { c1, c2, . . . , cn };
2◦ If φ is of the form ¬ψ, then C[φ] = C[ψ];
3◦ If φ is of the form φ1 ∧ φ2, then C[φ] = C[φ1] ∪C[φ2];
4◦ If φ is of the form Kψ, then C[φ] = C[ψ];
5◦ If φ is of the form notψ, then C[φ] = C[ψ].
Definition B.8 (Restriction of an MKNF Interpretation)
Let I ∈ I and M ∈ M. Given a finite set of predicate symbols P′ ⊆ P and a
set of constant symbols C′ ⊆ ∆, we define the restriction of I to P′ and C′ as
the Herbrand first-order interpretation I[P
′,C′] over the Herbrand Universe C′ that
interpretes only the predicates from P′ in such a way that
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ P
I[P
′,C′]
⇐⇒ (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ P
I
where P ∈ P′ and c1, c2, . . . , cn ∈ C′. We also define the restriction of M to P′ and
C′ as M [P
′,C′] =
{
I[P
′,C′]
∣∣∣ I ∈M }.
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Lemma B.9 (Truth of Ground Formulas under Restriction to Relevant Symbols)
Let φ be a ground MKNF formula, P′ ⊆ P a finite set of predicate symbols such
that P′ ⊇ P[φ], C′ ⊆ ∆ a finite set of constant symbols such that C′ ⊇ C[φ], I a
propositional interpretation and M,N ∈ M. Then
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒
〈
I[P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
|= φ .
Proof
We will prove by structural induction on φ:
1◦ If φ is a ground first-order atom of the form P (c1, c2, . . . , cn), then P ∈ P[φ] and
c1, c2, . . . , cn ∈ C[φ], so P ∈ P′ and c1, c2, . . . , cn ∈ C′. The following chain of
equivalences now proves the claim:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ P
I ⇐⇒ (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ P
I[P
′,C′]
⇐⇒
〈
I[P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
|= φ ;
2◦ If φ is of the form ¬ψ, then P[φ] = P[ψ] and C[φ] = C[ψ], so P′ ⊇ P[ψ] and
C′ ⊇ C[ψ]. Hence, we can use the inductive hypothesis for ψ as follows:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ 〈I,M,N〉 6|= ψ ⇐⇒
〈
I[P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
6|= ψ
⇐⇒
〈
I[P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
|= φ ;
3◦ If φ is of the form φ1 ∧ φ2, then P[φ] = P[φ1] ∪P[φ2] and C[φ] = C[φ1] ∪C[φ2] and
we can easily verify that the inductive assumption can be used on both φ1 and φ2
and the proposition can be proved for φ as follows:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ 〈I,M,N〉 |= φ1 ∧ 〈I,M,N〉 |= φ2
⇐⇒
〈
I[P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
|= φ1
∧
〈
I[P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
|= φ2
⇐⇒
〈
I[P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
|= φ ;
4◦ If φ is of the form Kψ, then P[φ] = P[ψ] and C[φ] = C[ψ], so P′ ⊇ P[ψ] and
C′ ⊇ C[ψ]. The claim now follows from the inductive hypothesis for ψ:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ (∀J ∈M) (〈J,M,N〉 |= ψ)
⇐⇒ (∀J ∈M)
(〈
J [P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
|= ψ
)
⇐⇒
(
∀J ∈M [P
′,C′]
)(〈
J,M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
|= ψ
)
⇐⇒
〈
I[P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
|= φ ;
5◦ If φ is of the form notψ, then P[φ] = P[ψ] and C[φ] = C[ψ], so P′ ⊇ P[ψ] and
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C′ ⊇ C[ψ]. The claim follows similarly as in the previous case:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ (∃J ∈ N) (〈J,M,N〉 6|= ψ)
⇐⇒ (∃J ∈ N)
(〈
J [P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
6|= ψ
)
⇐⇒
(
∃J ∈ N [P
′,C′]
)(〈
J,M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
6|= ψ
)
⇐⇒
〈
I[P
′,C′],M [P
′,C′], N [P
′,C′]
〉
|= φ .
Appendix C Properties of Hybrid Knowledge Bases
Lemma C.1
Let Z be a set of first-order theories. Then
mod
(⋃
Z
)
=
⋂
mod(Z)
where mod(Z) = {mod(S) | S ∈ Z }.
Proof
The following sequence of equivalences proves the claim:
I ∈ mod
(⋃
Z
)
Lemma B.5
⇐=======⇒
(
∀φ ∈
⋃
Z
)
(I |= φ)
⇐=======⇒ (∀S ∈ Z)(∀φ ∈ S)(I |= φ)
Lemma B.5
⇐=======⇒ (∀S ∈ Z)(I ∈ mod(S))
⇐=======⇒ I ∈
⋂
mod(Z)
Definition C.2 (Hybrid Immediate Consequence Operator)
The immediate consequence operator associated with the definite P-ground hybrid
knowledge base K = 〈O,P〉 is a mapping TK :M→M defined for any M ∈ M as
TK(M) = mod(O ∪ {H
∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) })
Lemma C.3
Let K = 〈O,P〉 be definite P-ground hybrid knowledge base. Then for every M ∈
M it holds that
TK(M) = mod(O) ∩mod({H
∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) })
Proof
Let S = {H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) }. We need to show that
mod(O ∪ S) = mod(O) ∩mod(S) .
This follows from Lemma C.1.
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Lemma C.4
Let DF be a finite directed set of first-order interpretations and r be a ground
definite rule. Then ⋂
DF |= B(r)⇐⇒ (∃M ∈ DF )(M |= B(r))
Proof
By Corollary A.7 we have
⋂
DF ∈ DF , so if
⋂
DF |= B(r), then also (∃M ∈
DF )(M |= B(r)). Now suppose that M |= B(r) for some M ∈ DF . Then M ≤⋂
DF and by a repeated use of Lemma B.4 for each conjunct of B(r) we obtain⋂
DF |= B(r).
Lemma C.5
Let D be a directed set of MKNF interpretations, P′ a set of predicate symbols
and C′ a set of constant symbols and
D[P
′,C′] =
{
M [P
′,C′]
∣∣∣M ∈ D } (C1)
Then the following holds:
(⋂
D
)[P′,C′]
=
⋂
D[P
′,C′]
Proof
(⋂
D
)[P′,C′]
=
(⋂
{M |M ∈ D }
)[P′,C′]
= ({ I | (∀M ∈ D)(I ∈M) })[P
′,C′]
=
({
I[P
′,C′]
∣∣∣ (∀M ∈ D)(I ∈M) })
=
({
I
∣∣∣ (∀M ∈ D)(I ∈M [P′,C′]) })
=
({
I
∣∣∣ (∀M ∈ D[P′,C′]) (I ∈M) })
=
⋂{
M
∣∣∣M ∈ D[P′,C′] } =⋂D[P′,C′]
Lemma C.6
Let D be a directed set of MKNF interpretations and r a ground definite rule.
Then:
(∃M ∈ D)(M |= B(r))⇐⇒
⋂
D |= B(r)
Proof
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Let P′ = P[B(r)] and C′ = C[B(r)] and consider these equivalences:
(∃M ∈ D)(M |= B(r))
Lemma B.9
⇐=======⇒ (∃M ∈ D)
(
M [P
′,C′] |= B(r)
)
(C1)
⇐=======⇒
(
∃M ∈ D[P
′,C′]
)
(M |= B(r))
Lemma C.4
⇐=======⇒
(⋂
D[P
′,C′]
)
|= B(r)
Lemma C.5
⇐=======⇒
(⋂
D
)[P′,C′]
|= B(r)
Lemma B.9
⇐=======⇒
⋂
D |= B(r)
Proposition C.7 (Continuity of TK)
Let K = 〈O,P〉 be a definite P-ground hybrid knowledge base. Then TK is a
continuous function on M.
Proof
Consider some directed subset D of M. To prove that TK is continuous, we need
to show that sup(TK(D)) = TK(sup(D)). By Lemma C.3, we have:
sup(TK(D)) = mod(O) ∩
⋂
M∈D
mod ({H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) }) .
Let S denote the set ⋂
M∈D
mod ({H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) }) (C2)
so that
sup(TK(D)) = mod(O) ∩ S (C3)
Consider the following identities:
S
Lemma C.1
========= mod
( ⋃
M∈D
{H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) }
)
========= mod ({H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧ (∃M ∈ D)(M |= B(r)) })
Lemma C.6
========= mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ P ∧⋂D |= B(r) })
Together with (C3) and Lemma C.3 this implies that
sup(TK(D)) = mod(O) ∩ S
= mod(O) ∩mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ P ∧⋂D |= B(r) })
= TK(sup(D)) .
Corollary C.8 (Monotonicity of TK)
Let K = 〈O,P〉 be a definite P-ground hybrid knowledge base. Then TK is a
monotonic function on M and for any n ≥ 0 it holds that T nK(I) ⊇ T
n+1
K (I).
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Proof
The monotonicity of TK follows directly from Props. C.7 and A.10. Now since I
is the minimal element of (M,≤), we obtain T 0K(I) = I ≤ T
1
K(I). By n times
applying the monotonicity of TK we obtain T
n
K(I) ≤ T
n+1
K (I) which is equivalent
to T nK(I) ⊇ T
n+1
K (I).
The following proposition shows that each definite P-ground hybrid knowledge
base either has no model at all, or, similarly as definite logic programs, it has the
greatest S5 model that coincides with its unique MKNF model. It also shows how
this model can be computed by iterating the TK operator starting from I.
Proposition C.9
Let K = 〈O,P〉 be a definite P-ground hybrid knowledge base. Then either K has
no S5 model or it has the greatest S5 model that also coincides with its single
MKNF model. Furthermore, the set
mod(K) =
⋂
n≥0
T nK(I)
is empty if K has no S5 model and otherwise coincides with its unique MKNF
model.
Proof
First we will prove an auxiliary claim: M ⊆ TK(M) holds for any S5 model M of
K. Suppose M is an S5 model of K and recall that
TK(M) = mod (O ∪ {H
∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) })
Let’s take some formula φ ∈ O. We know thatM |= φ becauseM is an S5 model of
K. Now consider some rule r ∈ P such that M |= B(r). Since M is an S5 model of
K, we obtain M |= H∗(r). Consequently, M |= H∗(r) for every such r. So M is an
S5 model of O∪{H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) } and since TK(M) is by definition of
mod(·) the greatest S5 model of O∪{H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) }, we can conclude
that M ⊆ TK(M).
Now we will proceed with the main part of the proof. Let
MK =
⋂
n≥0
T nK(I)
Then, by Corollary C.7 and Theorem A.12, MK is the least fixed point of TK. First
we will show that MK contains every S5 model of K. Assume, to the contrary, that
M is an S5 model of K such that M *MK. Then by definition M ⊆ I = T 0K(I). It
cannot be the case that M ⊆ T nK(I) for all n ≥ 0 because that would be in conflict
with M *MK. So let
n0 = max {n ≥ 0 |M ⊆ T
n
K(I) } .
Now we have M ⊆ T n0K (I) and by the auxiliary claim proved above, we obtain
M ⊆ TK(M) which together with the monotonicity of TK (Corollary C.8) yields
M ⊆ TK(M) ⊆ TK(T
n0
K (I)) = T
n0+1
K (I). However, this is in conflict with the
definition of n0, so no S5 model M of K with M *MK can exist.
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Now we will show thatMK models K. This can be easily verified for every φ ∈ O.
Take some r ∈ P . If MK 6|= B(r), then MK |= r and we are done. So assume
MK |= B(r). In this case we can use the fixpoint property of MK:
MK = TK(MK) = mod(O ∪ {H
∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧MK |= B(r) })
and conclude that MK |= H∗(r). Consequently also MK |= r.
We already proved that MK is the greatest set of interpretations that models K.
So in case K has no S5 model, MK will be empty. On the other hand, if K has
some S5 model, this model is included in MK, so MK is non-empty and hence is
the greatest S5 model of K. Further, by Corollary B.2 it follows that MK is also
the unique MKNF model of K.
For MKNF models of arbitrary P-ground hybrid knowledge bases we also obtain
a characterisation that is similar to the fixpoint definition of stable models of normal
logic programs:
Proposition C.10
An MKNF interpretation M is an MKNF model of a P-ground hybrid knowledge
base K = 〈O,P〉 if and only if M = mod(
〈
O,PM
〉
) where
PM =
{
H(r) ⊂ B+(r)
∣∣ r ∈ P ∧M |= B−(r) }
Proof
First notice that since P is ground, pi(r) = r for every r ∈ P ∪ PM .
Let KM =
〈
O,PM
〉
and suppose M is an MKNF model of K. First we will
show that M is an S5 model of KM . Obviously, M models all formulas from pi(O).
Suppose that rM = (H(r) ⊂ B+(r)) is a rule from PM . If M 6|= B+(r), then
M |= rM . On the other hand, if M |= B+(r), then M |= r implies also M |= H(r).
Consequently, M |= rM .
As M is an S5 model of KM , it must hold that M is a subset of mod(KM )
because mod(KM ) is the greatest S5 model of KM . By contradiction, we will show
that M = mod(KM ). Assume M ( mod(KM ). Since M is an MKNF model of
K, there must be some formula φ ∈ pi(K) and some I ′ ∈ mod(KM ) such that〈
I ′,mod(KM ),M
〉
6|= φ. But mod(KM ) models pi(O), so φ must be some rule r
from P and the following must hold〈
I ′,mod(KM ),M
〉
|= B−(r) ∧
〈
I ′,mod(KM ),M
〉
|= B+(r)
∧
〈
I ′,mod(KM ),M
〉
6|= H(r)
which is equivalent to
M |= B−(r) ∧mod(KM ) |= B+(r) ∧mod(KM ) 6|= H(r) .
However, this is in conflict with mod(KM ) being an S5 model of KM since H(r) ⊂
B+(r) ∈ PM .
For the converse implication, assume M is an MKNF interpretation such that
M = mod(KM ). It must hold that M |= pi(O), so consider some rule r ∈ P . If
M 6|= B−(r), then M is trivially a model of r. On the other hand, if M |= B−(r),
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thenM is also a model of H(r) ⊂ B+(r), soM is again a model of r. Consequently,
M is an S5 model of K. Now take some M ′ ) M . Then since M is the greatest
model of KM , there is some rule rM = (H(r) ⊂ B+(r)) ∈ PM such that M ′ 6|= rM ,
i.e.
M |= B−(r) ∧M ′ |= B+(r) ∧M ′ 6|= H(r)
For any I ′ ∈M ′, this is equivalent to
〈I ′,M ′,M〉 |= B−(r) ∧ 〈I ′,M ′,M〉 |= B+(r) ∧ 〈I ′,M ′,M〉 6|= H(r)
which in turn is equivalent to 〈I ′,M ′,M〉 6|= r. So M is indeed an MKNF model of
K.
Appendix D Properties of the Hybrid Update Operator
Proposition 3.2. Let P be a finite ground definite program, T a TBox and A a
sequence of ABoxes. Then TP⊕TA is a continuous function on the complete partial
order of all subsets of I with the least element I.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Consider some directed subset D of M. To prove that TP⊕TA is continuous, we
need to show that
sup(TP⊕TA(D)) = TP⊕TA(sup(D)) .
To simplify notation in this proof, we define for any set of first-order interpretations
M the following set:
con(M) = {H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) }
Notice that if M ⊇ N (or M ≤ N using the partial order on sets of first-order
intepretations), then con(M) ⊆ con(N).
By definition we now have
TP⊕TA(sup(D)) = mod
(
con
(⋂
D
)
⊕T A
)
= incorporateT
(
A,mod
(
T ∪ con
(⋂
D
)))
= incorporateT
(
A,mod(T ) ∩mod
(
con
(⋂
D
))) (D1)
and
sup(TP⊕TA(D)) =
⋂
M∈D
mod
(
con(M)⊕T A
)
=
⋂
M∈D
incorporateT (A,mod(T ∪ con(M)))
=
⋂
M∈D
incorporateT (A,mod(T ) ∩mod(con(M)))
(D2)
First suppose that a first-order interpretation I is in TP⊕TA(sup(D)). Then by the
previous equation we have that there is some J ∈ mod(T ) ∩ mod(con(
⋂
D)) such
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that
I ∈ incorporateT (A, J) .
Further, for every M ∈ D it holds that con(M) ⊆ con(
⋂
D), and, hence, also
that mod(con(
⋂
D)) ⊆ mod(con(M)). Consequently, J ∈ mod(con(M)) for every
M ∈ D, and so
I ∈ incorporateT (A,mod(T ) ∩mod(con(M)))
also holds for every M ∈ D. By (D2) we can now conclude that
I ∈ sup(TP⊕TA(D)) .
For the converse inclusion, suppose I /∈ TP⊕TA(sup(D)) and let S be the set of
all first-order interpretations J ∈ mod(T ) such that
I ∈ incorporateT (A, J) .
By (D1) we obtain that S ∩ mod (con (
⋂
D)) = ∅, i.e. that each J ∈ S is not
a model of some atom pJ such that there is a rule rJ ∈ P with H(rJ ) = K pJ
and
⋂
D |= B(rJ ). By Lemma C.6, this implies that for some M ∈ D we also have
M |= B(rJ ). Further, there are only finitely many rules in P , so by the directedness
of D we can find an interpretation MS ∈ D such that MS |= B(rJ ) for all J ∈ S.
For this interpretation it will hold that S ∩mod(con(MS)) = ∅. Hence,
I /∈ incorporateT (A,mod(T ) ∩mod(con(MS)))
and by (D2) we obtain that I /∈ sup(TP⊕TA(D)).
Proposition 4.1. Let P be a finite ground program, T a TBox, A an ABox and M
a minimal change dynamic stable model of P ⊕T A. Then M |= A.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
If M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of P ⊕T A, then it is a fixed point
of TPM⊕TA, i.e.
M = TPM⊕TA(M) = mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧M |= B(r) }⊕T A)
and by the definition of the classical minimal change update operator it must hold
that every I ∈M is a model of A. In other words, M |= A.
Proposition 4.2. Let P be a finite ground program, T , T ′ be TBoxes such that
mod(T ) = mod(T ′), A,A′ be ABoxes such that mod(A) = mod(A′) and M be
an MKNF interpretation. Then M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of
P ⊕T A if and only if M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of P ⊕T
′
A′.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Follows from the fact that the operators TPM⊕TA and TPM⊕T ′A′ are identical
because the classical minimal change update operator only operates with models of
T , T ′, A and A′, and not with their syntactic representation.
Proposition 4.3. Let P be a finite ground program, O = T ∪ A an ontology with
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TBox T and ABox A and M an MKNF interpretation such that for every subset
S of the set {H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) } the following condition is satisfied:
mod(S ⊕T A) = mod(S ∪ O) .
ThenM is an MKNF model of 〈O,P〉 if and only ifM is a minimal change dynamic
stable model of P ⊕T A.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
By Propositions C.10 and C.9, M is an MKNF model of 〈O,P〉 if and only if
M =
⋂
n≥0
T n〈O,PM〉(I) (D3)
where for any set of first-order interpretations N we have
T〈O,PM〉(N) = mod
(
O ∪
{
H∗(r)
∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧N |= B(r) }) .
On the other hand, by Proposition 3.2 and Theorem A.12, M is a minimal change
dynamic stable model of P ⊕T A if and only if
M =
⋂
n≥0
T nPM⊕TA(I) (D4)
where for any set of first-order interpretations N we have
TPM⊕TA(N) = mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧N |= B(r) }⊕T A) .
Suppose now that M is an MKNF model of 〈O,P〉. Then from (D3) and Lemma
B.4 we obtain that for every n ∈ N that{
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n〈O,PM〉(I) |= B(r) } ⊆ {H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) } .
Hence, by the assumption of the proposition,
mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n〈O,PM〉(I) |= B(r) }⊕T A)
= mod
(
O ∪
{
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n〈O,PM〉(I) |= B(r) }) (D5)
By induction on n we will now prove that T n〈O,PM〉(I) = T
n
PM⊕TA(I).
1◦ For n = 0 we have
T 0〈O,PM〉(I) = I = T
0
PM⊕TA(I)
2◦ We assume the claim holds for n− 1, i.e.
T n−1
〈O,PM〉
(I) = T n−1
PM⊕TA
(I) (D6)
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and prove that it holds for n. Indeed, we obtain:
T n〈O,PM〉(I) === mod
(
O ∪
{
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n−1〈O,PM〉(I) |= B(r) })
(D5)
==== mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n−1〈O,PM〉(I) |= B(r) }⊕T A)
(D6)
==== mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n−1PM⊕TA(I) |= B(r) }⊕T A)
=== T nPM⊕TA(I)
So (D4) is satisfied and consequentlyM is a minimal change dynamic stable model
of P ⊕T A.
For the converse statement, supposeM is a minimal change dynamic stable model
of P ⊕T A. Then from (D3) and Lemma B.4 we obtain for every n ∈ N that{
H∗(r)
∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T nPM⊕TA(I) |= B(r) } ⊆ {H∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧M |= B(r) } .
Hence, by the assumption of the proposition,
mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T nPM⊕TA(I) |= B(r) }⊕T A)
= mod
(
O ∪
{
H∗(r)
∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T nPM⊕TA(I) |= B(r) }) (D7)
By induction on n we will now prove that T nPM⊕TA(I) = T
n
〈O,PM〉(I).
1◦ For n = 0 we have
T 0PM⊕TA(I) = I = T
0
〈O,PM〉(I)
2◦ We assume the claim holds for n− 1, i.e.
T n−1
PM⊕TA
(I) = T n−1
〈O,PM〉
(I) (D8)
and prove that it holds for n. Indeed, we obtain:
T nPM⊕TA(I) === mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n−1PM⊕TA(I) |= B(r) }⊕T A)
(D7)
==== mod
(
O ∪
{
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n−1PM⊕TA(I) |= B(r) })
(D8)
==== mod
(
O ∪
{
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n−1〈O,PM〉(I) |= B(r) })
=== T n〈O,PM〉(I)
So (D3) is satisfied and consequently M is an MKNF model of 〈O,P〉.
Corollary 4.4. Let P be a finite ground program. Then M is a stable model of P if
and only if M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of P ⊕∅ ∅.
Proof of Corollary 4.4
Follows from the previous corollary and the fact that MKNF models coincide with
stable models on the class of normal logic programs (Lifschitz 1991).
Proposition 4.5. Let P be a finite ground program containing only facts, T a TBox,
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A a sequence of ABoxes and M an MKNF interpretation. Then M is a minimal
change dynamic stable model of P ⊕T A if and only if M is a minimal change
update model of SP ⊕T A where SP = { p | K p ∈ P }.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
Since P contains only facts, we can see that P = PM , so M is a minimal change
dynamic stable model of P ⊕T A if and only if M = mod(P ⊕T A) which by
definition holds if and only if
M =
⋂
n≥0
T nP⊕TA(I)
Further, we know that
T 0P⊕TA(I) = I
T 1P⊕TA(I) = mod({H
∗(r) | r ∈ P ∧ I |= B(r) } ⊕T A)
= mod({H∗(r) | r ∈ P } ⊕T A) = mod(SP ⊕
T A)
T nP⊕TA(I) = T
1
P⊕TA(I) for all n > 1
Hence, we have ⋂
n≥0
T nP⊕TA(I) = mod(SP ⊕
T A) .
So M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of P ⊕ U if and only if M =
mod(SP ⊕T A) which is by definition equivalent to M being a minimal change
update model of SP ⊕T A.
Lemma D.1
Let T be a TBox, A = (A1,A2, . . . ,An) a sequence of ABoxes (where n ≥ 1) and
A′ = (A1,A2, . . . ,Ai−1,Ai, ∅,Ai+1, . . . ,An)
for some i ∈ { 0, 1, 2, . . . , n }. Then for any M ⊆ mod(T ) it holds that
incorporateT (A,M) = incorporateT (A′,M)
Proof
We will prove by induction on n:
1◦ If n = 1, then i ∈ { 0, 1 }, so we need to prove that
incorporateT (A1,M) = incorporate
T (A1, incorporate
T (∅,M))
and that
incorporateT (A1,M) = incorporate
T (∅, incorporateT (A1,M)) .
This follows easily from the fact that incorporateT (∅, N) = N for any N ⊆ mod(T ).
2◦ We assume the claim holds for n− 1 and prove it for n. First let i = 0. Then
incorporateT (A′,M) = incorporateT (A, incorporateT (∅,M))
and the claim again follows from the fact that incorporate(∅, N) = N for any N ⊆
mod(T ).
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Now suppose i > 0 and let
B = (A2,A3, . . . ,An)
B′ = (A2,A3, . . . ,Ai−1,Ai, ∅,Ai+1, . . . ,An)
By the inductive assumption we know that for any N ⊆ T it is holds that
incorporateT (B, N) = incorporateT (B′, N)
Hence,
incorporateT (A′,M) = incorporateT (B′, incorporateT (A1,M))
= incorporateT (B, incorporateT (A1,M))
= incorporateT (A,M) .
Corollary D.2
Let T be a TBox, A = (A1,A2, . . . ,An) a sequence of ABoxes (where n ≥ 1) and
A′ = (A1,A2, . . . ,Ai−1,Ai, ∅,Ai+1, . . . ,An)
for some i ∈ { 0, 1, 2, . . . , n }. Then for any first-order theory S it holds that
mod(S ⊕T A) = mod(S ⊕T A′)
Proof
Follows by applying the previous lemma to M = mod(T ∪ S).
Proposition 4.6. Let P be a finite ground program, T a TBox and A a sequence of
ABoxes = (A1,A2, . . . ,An) (where n ≥ 1). Let
A′ = (A1,A2, . . . ,Ai−1,Ai, ∅,Ai+1, . . . ,An)
for some i ∈ { 0, 1, 2, . . . , n }. Then an MKNF interpretationM is a minimal change
dynamic stable model of P ⊕T A if and only if M is a minimal change dynamic
stable model of P ⊕T A′.
Proof of Proposition 4.6
We need to show that ⋂
n≥0
T nPM⊕TA(I) =
⋂
n≥0
T nPM⊕TA′(I) .
By induction on n we will prove that for all n ∈ N it holds that
T nPM⊕TA(I) = T
n
PM⊕TA′(I) .
1◦ For n = 0 we directly obtain
T nPM⊕TA(I) = I = T
n
PM⊕TA′(I) .
2◦ We assume the claim holds for n− 1 and prove it for n. We have
T nPM⊕TA(I) = mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n−1PM⊕TA(I) |= B(r) }⊕T A) .
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By the inductive assumption we obtain that T n−1
PM⊕TA
(I) = T n−1
PM⊕TA′
(I), so
T nPM⊕TA(I) = mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n−1PM⊕TA′(I) |= B(r) }⊕T A) .
Corollary D.2 now implies that
T nPM⊕TA(I) = mod
({
H∗(r)
∣∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ T n−1PM⊕TA′(I) |= B(r) }⊕T A′)
= T nPM⊕TA′(I) .
Proposition 4.7. Let T be a TBox, A an ABox and M an MKNF interpretation.
Then M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of ∅ ⊕T A if and only if M =
mod(T ∪ A).
Proof of Proposition 4.7
By Proposition 3.2 and Theorem A.12, M is a minimal change dynamic stable
model of ∅ ⊕T A if and only if
M =
⋂
n≥0
T nPM⊕TA(I)
where
T 0PM⊕TA(I) = I
T 1PM⊕TA(I) = mod(
{
H∗(r)
∣∣ r ∈ PM ∧ I |= B(r) }⊕T A) = mod(∅ ⊕T A)
T nPM⊕TA(I) = T
1
PM⊕TA(I) for all n > 1
So M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of ∅ ⊕T A if and only if M =
mod(∅ ⊕T A). Further,
mod(∅ ⊕T A) = incorporateT (A,mod(∅)) = incorporateT (A, I) = mod(T ∪ A) .
Hence, M is a minimal change dynamic stable model of ∅ ⊕T A if and only if
M = mod(T ∪ A).
